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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
CALVO V. MONTGOMERY COUNTY: THE DECISION OF 
WHETHER A TRIP FALLS UNDER THE SPECIAL MISSION 
EXCEPTION TO THE GOING AND COMING RULE IS FOR 
THE JURY, NOT SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
By: Adrián Martínez 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held the special mission 
exception to the going and coming rule may apply when an employee 
is tasked with attending a mandatory work training at a different 
location from their regular workplace. Calvo v. Montgomery Cty, 459 
Md. 315, 343, 185 A.3d 146, 163 (2018). This conclusion is further 
bolstered when the employee comes in on their day off. Calvo at 339, 
343, 185 A.3d at 161, 163. Since a reasonable jury could have rationally 
concluded the special mission exception applied, it was improper to 
grant summary judgment against the claimant. Id.
     Ms. Rina Calvo (“Calvo”) was employed by Montgomery County 
(“County”) for over 20 years in the capacity as a bus driver, working 
Monday to Friday.  Calvo received a letter informing her that she was 
scheduled to attend a mandatory work training, on a Saturday, and at a 
location she did not normally work.  While traveling to the training, 
Calvo was rear-ended and sustained personal injuries as a result of the 
accident. 
     Calvo filed a claim with the Workers’ Compensation Commission 
(“Commission”).  After a hearing, the Commission found Calvo’s 
injuries were compensable as they occurred in the course of her 
employment.  The County sought judicial review of the Commission’s 
award in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, and subsequently 
moved for summary judgement. In support of their motion, the County 
argued the going and coming rule specifically precluded Calvo’s claim. 
In opposition to that motion, Calvo argued, inter alia, the special 
mission exception to the going and coming rule applied, thus entitling 
her to workers’ compensation benefits.  The trial court ultimately 
granted the motion, finding as a matter of law the going and coming rule 
precluded recovery, and none of the exceptions to the rule applied.  The 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed, and Calvo filed a 
petition for a writ of certiorari, which the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted.  The issue before the court was whether an injury arising out 
of and in the course of employment is a question of fact.
     The Court began by examining the Workers Compensation Act, 
which provides compensation for a loss of earning capacity which 
results from accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of 
employment. Calvo, 459 Md. at 324, 185 A.3d at 151. In order to 
determine whether Calvo’s injuries arose out of her employment, the 
court applied the positional-risk test set forth in Livering v. 
Richardson’s Restaurant. Id. at 328, 189 A.3d at 154 (citing Livering v. 
Richardson’s Rest., 374 Md. 566, 823 A.3d 687 (2003)). The test 
provides that an injury arises out of the course of employment if it would 
not have happened but for the employment duties putting the employee 
in the situation causing the injuries.  Calvo, 459 at 327-288, 185 A.3d 
at 153-54 (citing Livering, 374 Md. at 575, 823 A.3d at 692). The court 
found Calvo’s injuries arose out of her employment as they would not 
have happened but for traveling to the employer’s mandatory training. 
Calvo, 459 at 328, 189 A.3d 154. 
     Next, the court analyzed whether Calvo’s injuries occurred in the 
course of her employment.  Calvo at 329, 185 A.3d at 154. The court 
considered the circumstances leading up to the injury, particularly time 
and place, and whether Calvo was either directly or indirectly carrying 
out her employment duties.  Id. at 328-29, 185 A.3d at 154.  Generally, 
injuries which occur while the employee is going and coming to work 
are not compensable.  Id. (citing Roberts v. Montgomery Cty, 436 Md. 
591, 606, 84, A.3d. 87, 98 (2014)).  However, if the special mission 
exception applies, an employee may be entitled to compensation that 
would ordinarily be precluded by the going and coming rule.  Calvo,
459 Md. at 333, 185 A.3d at 157.  A special mission is found when the 
employee is traveling in the course of their employment for a purpose 
which specifically benefits the employer’s business. Id. at 333, 185 
A.3d at 157 (citing Barnes v. Children’s Hosp., 109 Md. App. 543, 553-
56, 675 A.2d 558, 564-565 (1996)). Additionally, the exception may
apply when the trouble and time of making the trip, or special
inconvenience of making it in the particular situation, is sufficiently
substantial to be an integral part of the service itself. Id.
 Next, the court used the factors set forth in Barnes v. Children’s 
Hosp., to determine whether the special mission exception was 
applicable to Calvo’s trip. Calvo at 334-35, 185 A.3d at 158 (citing 
Barnes, at 555-56, 675 A.2d 558). Those factors are whether the trip 
was: not usually part of the employee’s regular duties; onerous in 
comparison to the task performed; or performed with a sense of urgency 
or suddenly required.  Calvo at 334, 185 A. 3d at 157-59 (citing Barnes,
at 557-58, 675 A.2d at 564-565).  Consulting Maryland precedent, as 
well as authorities from other jurisdictions, the court found that while 
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the going and coming rule applied, a reasonable jury could have 
rationally concluded the special mission exception applied. Calvo, at 
342, 185 A.3d at 162.
     In the 4-3 split decision, the Majority and Dissenting opinions 
focused on the application of the regularity of the journey. Calvo at 337, 
185 A.3d at 159; Id. at 349, 185 A.3d at 348 (Greene, J., dissenting). 
The court noted that there is a strong presumption the special mission 
exception does not apply when the employee’s duties regularly require 
trips. Id. at 335, 185 A.3d at 158.  The court distinguished Calvo’s trip 
from those which occur with more regularity and do not qualify as 
special missions, as in Jakelski where a police officer was injured on his 
way to his monthly court appearance to testify.  Calvo at 336, 185 A.3d 
at 159 (citing Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Jakelski, 45 Md. 
App. 7, 410 A.2d 1116 (1980). Here, the court found that Calvo’s annual 
customer service training was distinguishable from the monthly 
obligations in Jakelski, and therefore, a jury could have found that the 
special mission exception applied.  Calvo at 337, 185 A.3d 159. 
     While there are multiple ways for a trip to qualify as a special 
mission, in Calvo’s case the primary factor was being tasked to work on 
a day that she normally had off. Calvo. at 342-43, 185 A.3d 162.  The 
court likened Calvo’s trip to that in Barnes, where the employee was 
injured on her way to work on a day off.  Id. at 340, 185 A.3d at 161. 
The court reaffirmed that a journey to the usual workplace on a day off 
is onerous enough for the exception to apply.  Id. at 340, 185 A.3d at 
341. When viewed in that light, a reasonable jury could find requiring
Calvo to travel to a different location on her day off was unusual and
irregular enough for the special mission exception to apply. Id. at 330,
185 A.3d at 161.  Therefore, the circuit court erred in granting summary
judgment because the undisputed facts could have allowed a jury to find
the special mission exception applied.  Id. at 344, 185 A.3d at 163.
The Dissent argued that none of the Barnes factors suggested 
the trip was sufficiently unusual to allow the special mission exception 
to apply. Calvo at 347, 185 A.3d at 165. Using the dictionary definition 
of the word “periodical,” the Dissent found the annual work training 
was not isolated and was just as periodic as a monthly or weekly 
obligation. Id. at 348, 185 A.3d at 166. The dissent reasoned that just as 
the officer in Jakelski was expected to regularly appear in traffic court, 
Calvo could reasonably expect to attend an annual training. Id.
 As a result of this holding, practitioners may expect to see the 
continued erosion of the going and coming rule through the use of the 
positional-risk test, and continued growth of the special mission 
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exception by a broadened interpretation of what constitutes regularity 
and onerousness. To those who wish to prevent the compensability of 
such accidents, this case presents an economic dilemma by seemingly 
requiring that training be held on-site during a work day. The answer 
will most likely be decided using the economy of scales. For large 
employers, such as the County, increased frequency of on-site trainings 
would cost substantially more than paying for infrequent accidents. For 
smaller employers, however, it would be prudent to only hold on-site 
trainings on regular work days. Despite the loss of productivity, the cost 
of such an augmentation would be considerably less than paying out 
workers’ compensation claims, and the corresponding increase in 
premiums.
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